@ Julie Ritt, In-depth study of the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. 的回答
The short answer is that they were incapacitated (unconscious) within 90 seconds of the Columbia becoming uncontrollable when the crew module rapidly depressurized, and dead within a few minutes from blunt force trauma. (The shuttle began breaking up from extreme aerodynamic forces about 60 seconds after it became uncontrollable, with the crew module breaking up about 30 seconds after that.)
The long answer is significantly more complicated, and thoroughly unpleasant to consider, even knowing that they were already unconscious or dead before the rest of it happened. NASA did a “crew survivability study”, which has since been made public. (Redacted to remove any private details out of respect for the crew and their families.) It describes exactly what happened to the crew in such a way that, even though specific details were either removed or not put in, it is far clearer than most people care to imagine (and you can’t help but imagine it while reading the report).
长答案显然要复杂得多，而且考虑起来很不愉快，甚至包括他们在剩下的事情发生之前就已经昏迷或死亡。 NASA进行了“机组生存能力研究”，此研究已公开。 （删除以尊重宇航员及其家人的私人细节。）它准确地描述了船员所发生的事情，即使删除或不放入特定细节，也比大多数人清楚得多。 人们很想想象（您在阅读报告时不禁会想像）。
I’ll link to the report – it’s a PDF. But what essentially happened is that when the crew module (CM) separated from the forebody after the catastrophic event (CE) of the shuttle breaking up around 200,000 feet at Mach 18, it rapidly depressurized. (The crew members who had their helmets on – 6 of 7 – didn’t even have time to pull their visors down.) They lost consciousness within 10–15 seconds. While circulation may have continued for a short time, they could not have regained consciousness even if the CM had dropped mostly intact to a breathable altitude. Things that happened after that were also lethal, but they were essentially already dead before the CM broke up.
我将链接到报告-这是PDF。 但是实际上发生的是，在航天飞机发生灾难性事件（ catastrophic event ，CE）之后，乘员舱（ crew module ，CM）在约200,000英尺 18马赫（Mach） 速度下从前身分离，它迅速降压。 （戴头盔的宇航员人员中，7人中有6人甚至没有时间拉下面罩。）他们在10到15秒内失去了知觉。 虽然血液循环可能会持续很短的时间，但即使CM几乎完整地下降到了可呼吸的高度，他们也无法恢复意识。 此后发生的事情也具有致命性，但在CM解体之前，他们实际上已经死了。
At that point, the CM spun around on all three axes with such force that the crew’s shoulder straps broke, leaving them restrained only at the waist. Their bodies were spun around while their heads banged around inside their non-conforming helmets, inflicting lethal head wounds and damage to spines, etc. Had they been conscious, they could have braced themselves sufficiently to prevent such injuries, but they were not.
Within 30 seconds, the CM broke apart from the aerodynamic forces, exposing the crew to extreme winds and high altitude. The wind caused lethal blunt force trauma, as did being struck by pieces of the CM as it broke up around them.
The crew’s remains, or rather what was left of their remains, eventually fell and struck the ground – identified as the last lethal event in the report – surrounded by their equipment and the pieces of the CM that had been nearest them. (The report has a map of where the equipment that could be linked to each member fell. Being thrown out of the CM at Mach 18 did just as much damage to a human body as one would expect. I imagine that those who found the remains were seriously traumatized.) They had on parachutes, but they had to be manually activated. (They wore pressure suits similar to high-altitude pilots, but even if the crew had been able to configure their suits for pressure loss – pull down the visor, put on and zip the gloves, etc, all of which takes time – the suits wouldn’t have saved them at that altitude and speed.)
机组人员的遗体，或者更确切地说是部分的遗体，最终倒下并撞到地面-在报告中被确认为最后的致命事件-被其设备和离他们最近的CM碎片包围。 （该报告绘制了一张地图，显示了可以与每个成员关联的设备跌落的位置。在18马赫时从CM扔出对人体造成的伤害与人们预期的一样大。我想像是发现遗骸的人 （他们受到了严重的创伤。）他们曾使用降落伞，但必须手动激活。 （他们穿着类似于高空飞行员的压力服，但是即使机组人员能够为设置他们的压力服以对抗减压——拉下面罩，戴上并拉紧手套等，但所有这些都需要时间-这些压力服在那样的高度和速度救不了他们。）
The Columbia accident simply wasn’t survivable by any means we have now – shuttle breakup at 200,000 feet and Mach 18 isn’t something you can really build survival into now. But one problem that was recognized is that the crew had no training on how/when to recognize that a situation had gone from “recoverable emergency” to “survival situation.”
That being the case, they were almost certainly still trying to identify and fix the problem, with no idea that they’d lost the entire left wing, right up until the shuttle broke up. No “unfixable” simulations were (intentionally) run, so the crew had no way to recognize it when it happened. (They couldn’t see the wings, and there’s no “a wing just fell off” alarm.) It wouldn’t have helped them, bar buying them perhaps another 30 seconds of terror between CM depressurization and CM breakup, but it’s worth knowing in regards to training for any future missions and spacecraft.
既然如此，他们几乎肯定仍在尝试找出并解决问题，却不知道他们失去了整个左翼，直到航天飞机解体为止。 没有（有意）运行“无法修复”的模拟【？？】，因此机组人员不知道它发生的时间。 （他们看不到机翼，也没有“机翼刚坠落”的警报。）这对他们没有帮助，只会让他们在CM降压和CM解体之间再多恐惧30秒，但这是值得知道的 关于未来任务和航天器的培训。
Here’s the link – http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870ma… – to the crew survival report. (PDF warning.) Be aware – if you’re familiar with the story of the crew of Columbia, or even highly empathetic, it’s not an easy read. It’s not at all grisly or anything, but as I said, your imagination will almost certainly fill in far more details than you want it to do.
这是机组人员生存报告的链接-http：//www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870ma…。 （PDF警。）请注意-如果您熟悉Columbia机组人员的故事，或者非常有同情心，那么就很难读懂。 它一点也不费劲，但是正如我所说，您虽然希望事故不要发生，但您会自动想像事故发生的细节。
If you’re interested in the story itself – in how a 1.5 lb piece of foam brought down a $3 billion orbiter, killing seven amazing people in the process, I *highly* recommend “Comm Check: The last flight of the shuttle Columbia.”It’s an incredibly well-written book that tells the story of the crew, the people who worked on Columbia and got her ready to fly, NASA management, the decision to fly despite a strike to Discovery in October that literally came within six inches of causing a Challenger-type disaster, the subsequent foam strike on Columbia and how/why most believed that the strike couldn’t have damaged the shuttle, the accident itself, and the investigation afterward. It’s available from the Google Play Store for $10, as well as Amazon and similar sources.
如果您对故事本身感兴趣——1.5磅泡沫如何使一个价值30亿美元的轨道坠毁，在此过程中杀死了7名出色的人，我强烈建议您阅读《 Comm Check: The last flight of the shuttle Columbia》。这是一本写得非常出色的书，讲述了机组人员，这些人员在哥伦比亚号工作并准备飞行，NASA的管理层，发现号十月份的罢工，不到六英寸就能导致挑战者号那样的灾难，随后哥伦比亚号遭到泡沫撞击的事件，以及为什么/为什么大多数人认为这次事件不会破坏航天飞机，事故本身以及事后的调查。 它可以在Google Play商店以10美元的价格从亚马逊以及类似来源购买。
I can’t help but wonder what would have happened if the Shuttle crew had known the extent of damage to the wing. If everyone had known prior to deorbiting. Maybe ultimately it might have made no difference, but I’m sure everything possible would have been tried, including possible extreme measures.
In the case of Apollo 13, there was no question that the command module/lander assembly was seriously compromised, and they didn’t know the extent of the damage until Apollo 13 was near reentry. On the face of it, at the time of the accident, they had no idea how to handle the problem, but had time to work out a plan of action.
The Columbia was given no chance to assess the damage before reentry. Without the pressure of having to create a plan to try to get the shuttle back down damaged, we may never know if there was a way to do it.
Some times one hears of aircraft who manage to land after serious problems, and no one was able to recreate the landing in a simulator.
Maybe it wouldn’t have mattered … maybe the Columbia was doomed no matter what was tried. I guess we’ll never know for sure.
While we can’t know, we do have a pretty good idea. The CAIB made NASA look into ways to save the crew based on two assumptions that were not the case during Columbia’s mission.
虽然我们不知道，但我们确实有一个很好的主意。 如果哥伦比亚号中有两个假设的话， 那么 NASA 就能拯救机组人员。
First, that NASA recognized the potential severity of the strike within two days of launch, and second, that they would be willing to commit another shuttle and crew to flight without knowing what caused the foam strike on Columbia.
(Again, this was a hypothetical situation, done mostly, I suspect, to make people really think the next time a potential crisis comes up. While they knew of the strike, no one had any idea how severe it was – and no one “higher up” was willing to take steps to find out. The basic premise – repeated by the mission management team during Columbia’s mission – was,
“So, what if there is damage? We can’t do anything about it. Don’t you think it’s better that the crew not know, and die quickly during reentry after a great mission, than to worry about it and die anyway?”
“那么，如果有损坏怎么办？ 我们对此无能为力。 您难道不认为机组人员不知道，在完成一次重大任务后重返期间迅速死亡，比一直担心并最终死亡会更好吗？”
Yes, it still makes me angry to think about it. The idea that NASA ran things with such a defeatist attitude is sickening.)
Anyway, the CAIB asked for a report on what could have been done if those two conditions had been met. NASA produced an amazing report that outlined two possibilities. One had very little chance of success, and the other one, I couldn’t even hazard a guess at the odds. Ars Technica describes it very well here, and has the link to the actual report:
无论如何，CAIB要求提供一份报告，说明如果满足这两个条件该怎么办。 美国宇航局发表了一份惊人的报告，概述了两种可能性。 一个人很少有成功的机会，而另一个人我什至不能冒险猜测。 Ars Technica在这里对此进行了很好的描述，你可以在这儿看到：
The article is great and I highly recommend reading it. But to sum it up, there were two options:
One: Have the crew attempt to patch the damage (block the hole up with glorified bags of water that’d freeze in space), dump about 15,000lbs of stuff (the Spacehab module and other things), then attempt the reentry using a higher angle of attack to offer some protection to the sorta-patched wing. Then just…hope that the orbiter stays together and under control long enough to let the crew bail out.
一：让机组人员尝试修补损坏（用在太空中冻结的光亮水袋将孔堵塞），倾倒约15,000磅的东西（Spacehab模块和其他东西），然后尝试使用更高的 攻角可为经修补的机翼提供一定保护。 然后……只是希望轨道器保持在一起并处于控制之下足够长的时间，以使机组人员摆脱困境。
(Remember, they could only bail from an orbiter that was in a controlled glide and even then only when it was below 50,000 feet. Columbia lost control around 200,000 feet at Mach 15. The crew’s flight suits, fully pressurized, were only good up to 100,000 feet.)
（请记住，他们只能在处于受控滑行状态的轨道飞行器操作，甚至只有当飞行高度低于50,000英尺时才能操作。哥伦比亚大约200,000英尺时失控时速度18马赫 。机组人员的飞行服完全加压，只能承受 100,000英尺。）
Odds of success? Damned slim to zero!
Two: Send up another shuttle and four crew to save them. Atlantis was due to be launched six weeks after Columbia had launched, so she was well along in launch prep and could potentially have been used to rescue the crew. Columbia had carried up extra consumables – oxygen, food, lithium hydroxide canisters – for their planned sixteen day mission. All of that could have been stretched to 30 days, giving NASA time for a rescue attempt.
二：派遣另一名航天飞机和四名机组人员救他们。 亚特兰蒂斯号原定于哥伦比亚号发射六周后发射，因此发射准备工作进展顺利，可以用来救助船员。 哥伦比亚为计划的16天任务携带了额外的消耗品——氧气，食物，氢氧化锂罐。 所有这些稍加节省可以用到30天，这给了NASA进行救援的时间。
The article lays out the requirements in detail – I won’t try to repeat it all here. Suffice it to say, it would have made Apollo 13 look like a quiet training exercise by comparison. The damage had to be recognized within the first two days. Then you get to the actual rescue attempt itself.
本文详细列出了要求-在这里我将不再重复。 相比之下，Apollo 13简直就像在做防灾模拟演练一样。 必须在头两天内确认损坏。 然后您便可以进行实际的救援尝试。
Compressing six weeks of prep, creating the plan for and training two astronauts in at least one long EVA to retrieve the Columbia crew (and another to check Atlantis’ TPS tiles) while the commander and pilot practiced the launch, rendezvous with Columbia and landing, and any number of other things into three weeks is incredibly complex. All of it – planning and rescue – would have had to work absolutely perfectly the first time. There was literally no room for error. None.
压缩六个星期的准备工作，制定计划并在至少一个长的舱外活动中训练两名宇航员，以检查哥伦比亚机组人员（另一名宇航员检查亚特兰蒂斯的TPS瓷砖），而指挥官和飞行员练习发射，与哥伦比亚会合并着陆， 三周之内的其他任何事情都非常复杂。 所有这些-规划和救援-都必须在第一时间绝对完美地工作。 实际上没有犯错的余地。 没有。
I would love to think NASA could have done it in a way – but there is no way to know.
@Jeffrey A. Larson, I was a flight controller in Mission Control的回答
I spent a couple of weeks in East Texas picking up debris and helping to catalog it.
Julie Ritt’s answer is about as technically correct as any that you’re going to see here. I highly recommend reading that crew survivability document. If you only read the CAIB report, you have an incomplete and inaccurate account of what happened to Columbia. The specific mode of failure was wrong (structural failure in the CAIB, loss of control authority in the Crew Survivability Report).
@Julie Ritt的答案从技术上与您将在此处看到的答案一样都是对的。 我强烈建议阅读该机组人员的生存可能的技术文档。 如果您仅阅读CAIB报告，那么您对哥伦比亚发生的事情不会有完整和准确的印象。 特定的故障模式是错误的（CAIB中的结构故障，机组生存力报告中失去控制权）。
I worked in the Shuttle program for decades, so I was able to recognize what many debris items were at a glance (others took days of perusal by systems experts, still others were identified by part numbers). Let me tell you about the condition of various items from the crew compartment area.
An item of Flight Data File, the multivolume “operators manual” for the Shuttle. This is a ring-binder book printed on heavy (and relatively fire resistant) paper, with cover sheets of heavy, flexible, translucent plastic. For all practical purposes, it could have been hand-carried into the woods of east Texas, and dropped on the ground from a height of 3 feet. Of course it fell many miles from space.
飞行数据文件的一项，是航天飞机的多卷“操作员手册”。 这是一本活页夹书，印在重磅纸（相对耐火）上，封面上覆盖着厚重的，柔软的半透明塑料。 出于实用的目的，它被宇航员用手拿着带入了德克萨斯州东部的树林中，并从3英尺高的地方掉落在地面上。 当然，在之前它已经从太空坠落了许多英里。
Part of the aluminum structure of the middeck lockers, not the actual lockers themselves, but the frame they fit into. This was a piece of structural aluminum about a half inch thick. It was twisted and ripped apart, and heavily heat damaged. Please note that prior to the accident, the pristine piece of flight data file and this heavy structural part were less than 10 feet from each other.
中层储物柜的铝制结构的一部分，不是实际的储物柜本身，而是它们所适合的框架。 这是一块约半英寸厚的结构铝。 它被扭曲并撕开，严重受热损坏。 请注意，在事故发生之前，原始的飞行数据文件与该较重的结构部件之间的距离不到10英尺。
A Hassleblad camera film cannister, lying in a field. I am told the film inside was recovered and found to be used, containing mostly photography of earth. The film was undamaged and the images were recovered.
躺在田野中的Hassleblad相机胶卷筒。 有人告诉我里面的胶卷已被发现并曾被宇航员使用过，其中大部分包含了地球的照片。 胶卷未受损，图像已恢复。
The sole of an EMU (spacesuit) boot, torn from the rest of the boot and lying in the forest. The rest of the boot was nowhere near it; I don’t know if it was ever recovered.
一个EMU（太空服）靴子的鞋底，被靴子的其余部分撕下并躺在森林中。 靴子的其余部分距离它不远。 我不知道它是否曾经被恢复过。
I did find identifiable human remains…identifiable as human, little else. I never found out which crewmember they belonged to. Based on relative size, I suspect it was one of the crew members whom I didn’t know personally (I lost a couple of friends on that flight). I’m sure they were able to match the remains to the deceased crew member through forensic means. Not to go into too much gory detail, but this was a fragment of a body about 2.5 feet long.
我确实发现了可识别的人类遗骸……可识别为人类，别无其他。 我从来不知道他究竟是谁。 根据相对尺寸来说，我怀疑这是我个人不认识的机组人员之一（在那次飞行中我失去了几个朋友）。 我确信他们能够通过法医手段将遗骸与死去的宇航员相匹配。 不必过多赘述，但这只是一个约2.5英尺长的尸体的一部分。
It is as the Crew Survivability Report described. The entire Crew Compartment imploded, crushing the crew. As the Orbiter fragmented, each large piece spun off on its own trajectory, retaining some debris all the way to the ground and ejecting other debris as it fell. I found items from the crew cabin at a site roughly 50 miles from the four items mentioned above…all were less than 20 feet from each other prior to the breakup.
正如宇航员生存报告所述。 整个乘员舱内爆，炸毁了机组人员。 随着轨道飞行器的破碎，每个大块都按照自己的轨迹旋转，将一些碎片一直保留到地面，并在坠落时将其他碎片逐出。 我在离上述四个物品约50英里的一个地方的机舱中发现了物品…在解体之前，所有物品彼此之间的距离都小于20英尺。
@ Julie Ritt ，即第一位答主
I try to make my answers on this topic as correct as possible out of respect for both the crew and the good ship Columbia. I’m old enough to remember watching the launch and subsequent loss of Challenger, but was too young at the time -only six – to truly understand what I was seeing. It was very different and far more painful with Columbia – although obviously nothing like having friends on her.
我出于对船员和哥伦比亚号的尊重，力图使我对这个问题的回答尽可能正确。 我年龄足够大，可以记住观看挑战者号的发射和随后的损失，但是当时还太年轻（只有六岁），无法真正理解我所看到的。 这与哥伦比亚大不相同，也更加痛苦。
May I ask something? It’s nothing private or related to the crew or such. It’s simply that I’ve found a contradiction between what was said about gauges and re-entry on the last flight vs what several other sources have said about gauges and re-entry. I’m not sure which is accurate.
我能问一个问题吗？ 它不是私人的，也不与机组人员等有关。 只是我发现在最后一次航天飞机发射中，关于仪表和再入大气的说法，与其他一些消息中关于仪表和再入大气的说法之间存在矛盾。 我不确定哪个是正确的。
I didn’t work on the last Shuttle flight, but if I can answer your question, I will.
I apologize for the delay. I’ve had a headache for eighteen years. Some days – and weeks – it’s worse than others. These past few weeks have definitely been “worse”.
Anyway. My question isn’t particularly complex, but it does require a little background. Please bear with me – I will get to the point, I promise.
无论如何。 我的问题并不特别复杂，但确实需要一些背景知识。 请多多包涵-我保证，我会讲到重点。
I was reading an article about the near-miss in ‘88, when Atlantis took all that foam damage (the 700+ tiles) and Mission Control misunderstood the severity due to the video quality. The article refers to a part in “Riding Rockets” where Hoot talks about the incident:
“…as the shuttle fell into the discernible atmosphere, Gibson kept his eyes on a gauge that showed how much the elevons at the back of each wing were deflected.
“……当航天飞机坠入可辨认的大气层时，吉布森的眼睛一直盯着一个仪表，该仪表显示了每个机翼后部的 升降副翼 偏转了多少。
“I knew that what would happen was, if we started to burn through we would change the drag on that wing,” he said, “which is exactly what happened to Columbia. We would change the drag on the right wing and what we’d see happening is, we’d start seeing right elevon trim, you’d start seeing right aileron, if you will, trim, which means putting down the left elevon, moving the left elevon down.
他说：“我知道会发生什么，如果我们开始燃烧下去，我们将改变机翼上的阻力，这正是哥伦比亚所发生的事情。我们将改变右机翼上的阻力，而我们希望发生的事情是，我们将开始看到右 升降副翼 被修正，您将开始看到右副翼，如果愿意的话，修正吧，这意味着放下左 升降副翼，向下移动左 升降副翼 。
I knew we would start developing a split (between right and left wing elevon positions) if we had excessive drag over on the right side. The automatic system would try to trim it out with the elevons. That is one of the things we always watched on re-entry anyhow, because … if you had half a degree of trim, something was wrong, you had a bunch of something going on if you had even half a degree. Normally, you wouldn’t see even a quarter of a degree of difference on the thing.
我知道如果我们在右侧过度拖动，我们很可能让其裂开（在右翼和左 升降副翼 位置之间）。 自动系统将尝试使用升降副翼对其进行修正。 无论如何，这是我们经常要注意的事情之一，因为…如果修整了一半，那是不对的，如果修整了一半，那么就会发生很多事情。 通常，您不会在事情只看到一点差异。
“So I knew that that’s what I was going to see if it started to go,” Gibson said. “And therefore, that told me that I’d have at least 60 seconds to tell mission control what I thought of their analysis.”’
So Hoot is very clear that not only did he know exactly what to expect in case of a burn through – as would any pilot – but that pilots always watch the trim on the way in.
In Rick Houston’s “Wheels Down”, there’s a reference to watching the trim during re-entry by one of the astronaut commanders. I listened to it on Audible and thought I had bookmarked it, but I’m unable to find it, so apparently not.
在里克·休斯顿（Rick Houston）的“ Wheels Down ”节目中，提到了一位宇航员指挥官在在再入大气时观看修正情况。 我在Audible上听过它，并以为我已将其添加为书签，但是我找不到它了。
Everything I’ve read about Rick Husband says he was an extremely attentive commander. Willie McCool was a first time pilot, so while he had nothing to compare it to, he was described as similarly attentive to detail. They’d trained for this mission for almost three years. In addition, they knew there had been a foam strike. Yes, they were told that it wasn’t anything serious, but they still were aware of what had happened and where it happened – and the potential results if the analysis was wrong. They knew what the effects of a burn through would likely cause.
我所读到的有关 Rick Husband （哥伦比亚号的指挥官） 的一切，都说他是一个非常细心的指挥官。 威利·麦考尔（Willie McCool）是第一次当飞行员，因此尽管他没有什么可比拟的，但他被描述为同样注重细节。 他们为此任务训练了将近三年。 此外，他们知道发生了泡沫撞击问题。 是的，他们被告知这不是什么严重的事情，但是他们仍然知道发生了什么，发生了什么-以及如果分析错误可能带来的结果。 他们知道烧穿的影响可能会导致什么。
Yet as Comm Check puts it:
《 Comm Check: The last flight of the shuttle Columbia》 是这样说的：
The shuttle stayed on course. Husband and McCool may have noticed the elevon movements as the autopilot responded, but again, they made no attempt to contact Mission Control for an explanation. In all likelihood, they still believed the entry was proceeding normally.航天飞机一直沿途航行。 Husband 和 McCool 可能已经注意到自动驾驶仪报告的 升降副翼 情况，但同样，他们也没有尝试联系任务控制部进行解释。 他们极有可能仍认为再入大气进展正常。
In the MCC, Jeff Kling and those supporting him in the MER all thought of the left wing and a potential burn through the instant the sensors starting dropping off-scale low. So did Hmm and Rocha when they heard it from the “viewing area”. They didn’t want to believe that Columbia was in trouble – who would! – but the thought still crossed their minds.
在MCC中，杰夫·克林（Jeff Kling）及其在MER中为他提供支持的人都想到了左侧机翼，以及传感器开始偏离刻度低点的瞬间可能被烧毁。 当Hmm和Rocha从“查看区域”听到声音时，也是如此。 他们不想相信哥伦比亚有麻烦-谁会！ -但想法仍然浮现在脑海。
So I’m not sure how to phrase what I’m asking, but something just doesn’t add up there. I don’t know if Rick would have told the rest of the crew about the strike, but I assume so. So they’re on re-entry, the left wing starts acting oddly – which occurred for some minutes before the sensors started dropping off – then the gauges – but no one is concerned? The sensors showed a problem in the MCC at 8:52:17 (I know the crew couldn’t see that.) The elevons started acting unusually at 8:52:30. Columbia didn’t suffer LOC until 9:00.
因此，我不确定如何用语表达想问的事，但是有些事情并没有就此达成共识。 我不知道里克是否会告诉其他机组人员这次撞击事件，但我认为是。 所以当他们要再入时，左机翼开始动作异常-发生在传感器开始下降之前的几分钟-然后是压力表-但是没有人注意到吗吗？ 传感器在8:52:17的MCC中显示了一个问题（我知道机组人员看不到。）在8:52:30， 升降副翼 开始异常。 哥伦比亚直到9:00才遭受LOC影响。
The contradictions inherent here…I’m having a hard time reconciling them. Hoot Gibson said they always watched that sort of thing. He also said he knew what the effects of a burn through would be. Rick Husband was a great pilot who had flown on the Shuttle before and a great commander who cared deeply about his crew. Willie McCool was a rookie on the shuttle but a great pilot. Kalpana Chawla was on her second flight, the flight engineer, and a highly experienced pilot in her own right, favoring acrobatics as I understand it. At very least Rick and Willie – and presumably the rest of the crew – knew there had been a foam strike in the vicinity of the left wing.
这里固有的矛盾……我很难调和它们。 霍特·吉布森（Hoot Gibson）说，他们一直在看这种东西。 他还说，他知道烧穿的后果。 里克·哈斯班德（Rick Husband）是一位伟大的飞行员，之前曾乘坐过航天飞机，也是一位伟大的司令官，他非常关心他的机组人员。 威利·麦库（Willie McCool）是航天飞机上的新秀，但他是一名出色的飞行员。 卡尔帕纳·乔瓦（Kalpana Chawla）正在她的第二次飞行中，是飞行工程师，也是一位经验丰富的飞行员。 至少里克和威利-大概还有其他机组人员-知道左翼附近发生了泡沫撞击。
Yet they sat for almost ten minutes before the LOC, not noticing the changing trim and whatnot – or noticing it and saying nothing to Mission Control? Not even with about three minutes before LOC (not that he could have known that) when it became clear that something was likely very wrong – or even with the ninety seconds after the system said the lending gear was deployed – did he make sure everyone was helmeted and sealed in, just in case? I know they couldn’t keep the system sealed for long, due to the oxygen being released into the cabin, but still. It just…doesn’t make sense. That seems very unlike him. Perhaps it was simply due to an apparent lack of training in recognizing when a situation moved from recoverable to emergency mentioned in the crew survivability study?
然而，他们在LOC之前坐了将近十分钟，却没有注意到不断变化的机翼和其他内容-还是注意到了，却没对任务控制部？ 甚至在LOC出现前大约三分钟（不是他本可以知道），当事情变得很可能很不对劲时，系统在高空中说放出了起落架之后的90秒之内，他是否确保所有人都 戴上头盔并密封，以防万一？ 我知道由于氧气被释放到机舱中，他们无法长时间保持系统密封，但仍然如此。 只是……没有道理。 那似乎和他很不一样。 也许仅仅是由于显然缺乏培训，所以不知道情况是什么时候从“可以挽救的紧急情况”变化到“生存问题”的？
So I’m not sure it’s a true question – which is the other reason I haven’t posted it publicly – but more a lack of understanding and confusion about those contradictions.
I don’t know that this is really a complete answer to your question, but it’s what I know.
First, as a former flight controller, I vastly prefer to work in MET, but as many of the online resources are in EST and that’s what you’ve used, I’ll go with that.
I don’t think you can really compare the tile damage on STS-27 with the RCC leading edge damage on STS-107. I suppose you could say they had the potential to lead to the same catastrophic outcome, but I wouldn’t be as confident predicting assymetric drag on the vehicle for STS-107 as I would for STS-27. It makes sense that Hoot would be hawking the trim disparity on the way down. It would be SOP to maintain an awareness of assymmetric trim, but not SOP to to hawk it that closely. That’s just the sort of guy Hoot is, he’s the test pilot’s test pilot. Charlie Bolden said that the two best pilots in the program were John Young and Hoot. I’ve never flown with either man, but from watching Mr. Young approach engineering decisions, I’d say that’s high praise.
我认为您无法真正将STS-27上的瓷砖损坏与STS-107上的RCC前缘损坏进行比较。 我想您可以说它们有可能导致同样的灾难性后果，但我对STS-107的不对称阻力预测不如对STS-27那样自信。 这是有道理的，Hoot会在下降的过程中弥补微不足道的差距。 保持对非对称修整的了解将是SOP，但要紧紧抓住这一点则不是SOP。 这就是Hoot的那种人，他是测试飞行员的测试飞行员。 查理·博尔登（Charlie Bolden）说，该计划中最好的两名飞行员是约翰·杨（John Young）和胡特（Hoot）。 我从来没有和任何一个人一起飞过，但是看着扬先生处理工程决策时，我会说这是很高的赞美。【？？】
No knock on Rick Husband’s abilities, but a half degree difference between the two is only noticeable via instrumentation, as they travel +40 degrees and -25 degrees. I also believe the STS-107 crew was given a false sense of security by the ground team. If you look at the video (xxxxx), they all seem rather casual to me. That doesn’t look like a crew that’s worried that they only have a few minutes to live. The video goes up to about 8:47:30.
Rick Husband的能力没那么差，但是两者之间只有半度的差异只能通过仪器来观察到，因为它们的移动角度分别为+40度和-25度。 我也相信地面小组给STS-107机组人员以虚假的安全感。 如果您看看这个视频（【译注：视频挂了】），对我来说，他们似乎都很放松。 看起来机组人员并不像是在担心他们只有几分钟的生存时间了。 该视频大约持续8:47:30。
Regardless of whether Rick was hawking the elevon split, it would be absolutely impossible to miss the alarm (probably a class 3, but my memory is fuzzy and I was never a MMACS guy) at 8:53:02 when the HYD SYS 1 line temp went offscale low (followed by temp sensors in the other lines within a few seconds). I guarantee you the crew was working the procedure for that (which probably led them to conclude the temp sensors were not needed for entry). MMACS made the call to FLIGHT at 8:54:24, and I would bet a dollar that there was some chatter between MMACS and his back room before that call was made. The crew never called this and what must have been several alarms to MCC, but did try to make some sort of call at 8:58:58, just before they were cut off. CAPCOM tried to return the call at 8:59:24, less than half a minute later (“And Columbia, Houston, we see your tire pressure messages and we did not copy your last.”) That’s exactly how the call should have gone, it conveyed ground awareness of an in-flight problem (as best the ground understood it) and let the crew know that the ground had not received a complete transmission (so they would have to repeat something).
无论Rick是否在在处理裂开的升降副翼，都绝对不可能在8:53:02的HYD SYS 1行时错过警报（可能是3类，但是我的记忆模糊并且我从不曾是MMACS的家伙） 温度降低到标尺外的低水平（随后几秒钟被其他行中的温度传感器探测到）。我保证您的工作人员正在处理这件事（这可能导致他们得出结论，再入大气时不需要温度传感器）。 MMACS在8:54:24拨打了FLIGHT的电话，我敢打赌，在拨打电话之前，MMACS和他的后室之间有些争吵。机组人员从未拨打过电话，这一定是向MCC发出了几条警报，但他们确实试图在中断之前的8:58:58发出某种呼叫。 CAPCOM尝试在不到半分钟后的8:59:24回复呼叫（“哥伦比亚号，这是休斯顿，我们看到了您的压力被破坏消息，而我们没有听清楚您的最后一条消息。”）这正是呼叫应该如何进行的方式，它传达了地面对飞行中问题的关注（就地面而言，这是最好的关注方式），并让机组人员知道地面没有接收到完整的信号（因此，他们不得不重复一遍）。
Now, I think the crew would have started noticing off-nominal roll roll and yaw movement about 8:58:09, and we know they got a BFS alert for tire pressure at 8:58:40.
Put it together, and you have a crew that gets 4 weird and slightly suspicious nusiance alarms at 8:53, which makes a great distraction, followed by a “bump in the road” 5 minutes later, and half a minute after that, loss of tire pressure which is REALLY SERIOUS (bail out over KSC and parachute down while watching a billion-dollar orbiter spash down in the Atlantic). 18 seconds after the tire pressure alarm, they make their last call, and never finish it. We do know that Willie McCool was furiously flipping switches over on his right-hand panel, desperately trying to cobble together a procedure on the fly that would restore hydraulic function (alas, not much chance of that when hot plasma has just eaten through your left-wing hydraulic lines).
把这些放在一起，宇航员会在8:53收到4个奇怪的和有点可疑的令人讨厌的警报，这使人分心，随后5分钟后“继续飞行”，此后半分钟，失压真的很严重（通过肯尼迪航天中心救援并降落伞下来，同时观看大西洋上十亿美元的轨道飞行器撞击声）。 气压警报发出18秒后，地面控制拨打了最后一个电话，但从未结束。 我们确实知道，威利·麦库（Willie McCool）疯狂地翻转了右侧面板上的开关，拼命试图拼凑一个可以恢复液压功能的程序（可惜，当刚从您的机翼左侧遇到热的等离子体，这种可能性很小 -机翼液压管路）。【？？？】
My take is that based on ground conversations, Rick had no reason to hawk the elevon splits, and even if he had, wouldn’t have noticed anything until 8:58:09. The flight deck is normally a little busy during the 8:50 – 9:00 timeframe even if nothing goes wrong, they got nuisance alarms at 8:53, convinced themselves that they were ok, and then all hell broke loose at 8:58.
我的看法是，基于地面对话，Rick没有理由去修理升降副翼的裂缝，即使他有，直到8:58:09也不会注意到任何事情。 在8:50-9:00的时间段内，驾驶舱通常会有点忙，即使没有任何问题，他们也会在8:53收到令人讨厌的警报，确信自己还好，然后在8:58一切都变得混乱 。
On the other hand, Hoot KNEW he would get abnormal elevon splits, and knew whether or not he ever saw terra firma again depended on just how far out of sync those elevons got. Different flight, different scenario. I doubt he had a lot of weird nusiance alarms during that time frame to contend with, or else he’d have mentioned them in that write up.
另一方面，Hoot 知道会有异常的 升降副翼 裂开，并且知道他是否再一次见到飞机正常飞行取决于这些 升降副翼 的同步程度。 不同的飞机，不同的场景。 我怀疑他在此期间是否有很多奇怪的令人讨厌的警报需要解决，否则他会在这篇文章中提到它们。
Again, not sure that answers your question, but I hope it gives you some insight. It’s a matter of psychology and priorty management. If there was “something suspicious” with one of my systems and not much else to do, I’d hawk that parameter just to see if there was really something going on with it. But if there was a confirmed malfunction with something I was responsible for, I’d all but forget about the lone suspicious parameter, and would focus on helping the crew get through the malfunction procedure. It’s just a matter of priorities, and dealing with the most important problem first.
同样，不确定这是否能回答您的问题，但我希望它能为您提供一些信息。 这是心理学和优先级管理的问题。 如果系统之一存在“可疑的参数”，而没有其他事情要做，那么我会检查该参数，以查看它是否确实存在问题。 但是，如果有确定是由我负责的故障，而将重点放在帮助机组人员解决故障程序上，而忽视掉可疑的参数。这只是优先事项管理，首先要解决最重要的问题。
@ C Stuart Hardwick 的回答
At the time of failure, NASA determined, one astronaut was sans helmet, one was moving about the cabin, three were not wearing gloves, and “several” were not fully buckled in, but in this instance, none of this made any difference.
26 seconds after the first master alarm, cabin pressure failed. By the time the pressure reached near vacuum 41 seconds later at 100,000 feet, the crew members not fully suited up were already unconscious, but within seconds, the cabin was disintegrating around them.
Like everything else in the cabin, the crew were torn apart by hypersonic turbulence and multiple violent impacts, and partially burned by adiabatic heating and fire. I am not going to repeat here the accounts of grisly finds around Norwood, Texas, but suffice it to say, employees of the Starr Funeral Home, in Hemphill, drove out in a motorcade of 15 cars and refrigerated vehicles to collect the remains of what was believed to be just one of the crew.
This is a spacesuit helmet found in Norwood—or rather its the shell of a helmet with the faceplate, hinge, and all other hardware stripped away and its rear quarter delaminated, apparently by a blunt impact. I don’t know if it was being worn, but mercifully, it didn’t do its wearer a whit of good.